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Justice Souter on Government Speech
Sheldon Nahmod
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice David Souter, who replaced Justice William Brennan, was
seated on October 3, 1990, and retired on June 29, 2009. As it
turns out, Justice Souter’s tenure coincided exactly with the birth
and development of the government speech doctrine1 in the
Supreme Court. Rust v. Sullivan2 was handed down in 1991, and
the most recent case, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,3 was handed
down in 2009.
Justice Souter provided the fifth vote in Rust, generally regarded
as the seminal government speech case,4 and was thus present at the
creation of the government speech doctrine. He joined the majority
in Rust, a decision he may have come to regret,5 but did not write an
 Copyright, 2010. Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
A.B., U. of Chicago; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A. Religious Studies, U. of Chicago
Divinity School. I thank Moshe Marvit, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Class of 2010, for his
invaluable assistance on an early draft of this Article and for our many conversations on
government speech. I also thank the Brigham Young University Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this symposium on government speech.
1. When speech falls within the category of government speech, it is immunized from
any meaningful First Amendment free speech scrutiny, as the cases discussed in this Article
illustrate. The government becomes a “market participant” in the marketplace of ideas rather
than a regulator of that marketplace, analogous to the dormant Commerce Clause immunity of
state and local governments when they are market participants. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809–10 (1976).
2. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Later, I suggest that the self-government rationale of the First
Amendment might do a better job of accounting for Justice Souter’s concerns with the
government speech doctrine than the marketplace of ideas rationale. See discussion infra pp.
2110–11.
3. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
4. The term “government speech” does not appear in Rust. However, as pointed out
in Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (citations omitted), discussed
infra p. 2107, “The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the
counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when
interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust on this
understanding.”
5. Interestingly, his predecessor, Justice Brennan, came to regret his early opinion and
vote in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), dealing with obscenity doctrine. See Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I am convinced
that the approach initiated 16 years ago in Roth . . . , and culminating in the Court’s decision
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opinion. In contrast, in almost every subsequent government speechrelated case, Justice Souter wrote concurrences or dissents that
demonstrated a deep engagement with the doctrine. Over the course
of his tenure on the Court, his views evolved along with those of the
Court as he became increasingly sensitive to the Court’s expanding
use of the doctrine.
His position ultimately reflected several major concerns that
lower courts and academic commentators continue to explore: the
definition and scope of government speech, the closely related
question of political accountability, and the interplay between the
government speech doctrine and the Establishment Clause. For
example, who decides whether it is the government that is speaking
and what it is saying? What standards does the decision maker use for
that decision? Why should government speech be immunized from
First Amendment free speech scrutiny? And isn’t there the potential
of considerable tension between the government speech doctrine
and the Establishment Clause?
This Article is modest in scope and primarily descriptive. I
propose to address each of the nine Supreme Court decisions in
which government speech is discussed either by the Court or by
Justice Souter, with an emphasis on Justice Souter’s often differing
and cautionary observations about the doctrine. I do not engage
here at a normative level with the government speech doctrine, even
though I am worried about the Court’s increasing use of the
doctrine to avoid difficult First Amendment issues.
II. BIRTH AND UNCERTAIN BEGINNINGS: RUST AND ROSENBERGER
Oral argument in Rust v. Sullivan was held on October 30,
1990, which made Rust one of the first cases that Justice Souter
heard.6 In a 5-4 vote that almost certainly would have gone the other
way had Justice Brennan still been on the Court, the Court, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld federal regulations that
prohibited doctors from engaging in abortion counseling as part of a
federally funded Title X project.7
The ruling rested on the distinction between a subsidy and a
restriction. The Court began with the premise that government may
today, cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental First
Amendment values.” (citations omitted)).
6. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 173.
7. Id. at 177.
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choose to fund one activity to the exclusion of another, even if the
latter involves the exercise of a fundamental right.8 It then
determined that Rust was not an “unconstitutional conditions” case
because Title X focused on the project rather than the grantee.9 Title
X did not absolutely restrict the recipients of funding from engaging
in pro-abortion activities; it merely mandated that Title X projects
not include such activities.10 Therefore, if a doctor wished to go
beyond the scope of a Title X program, he or she remained free to
do so. Title X merely required that the funds for Title X projects be
segregated from funds used to support activities beyond the scope
allowed by Title X.11
Four justices dissented.12 “Until today, the Court never has
upheld viewpoint-based suppression of speech simply because that
suppression was a condition upon the acceptance of public funds.”13
For Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, what distinguished
Rust from Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,14
which dealt with funding coupled with conditions, was that Title X
was in part aimed at the suppression of “dangerous ideas.”15 Because
the counseling and referral provisions in Title X were both contentand viewpoint-based, they violated the First Amendment.16 These
three dissenters further argued that the majority’s mantra that
government is free to fund one activity to the exclusion of another
was overly simplistic and not correct.
Clearly, there are some bases upon which government may not rest
its decision to fund or not to fund. For example, the Members of
the majority surely would agree that government may not base its
decision to support an activity upon considerations of race. As
8. Id. at 182.
9. Id. at 196.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justice Marshall and by Justice Stevens in part
and by Justice O’Connor in part. Id. at 203–04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor
separately dissented, arguing that it was not necessary for either the Court or the other
dissenters to reach the First Amendment issues. Id. at 223–24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). The Court here upheld a content-neutral provision of the
Internal Revenue Code that disallowed tax-exempt status to organizations that attempted to
influence legislation while at the same time giving such status to veterans’ organizations
regardless of their lobbying activities. Id. at 546–48.
15. Rust, 500 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
16. Id.
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demonstrated above, our cases make clear that ideological
viewpoint is a similarly repugnant ground upon which to base
funding decisions.17

A further problem with the Title X restrictions, according to
these three dissenters, was that the women counseled would view the
speech as originating with their doctors rather than as speech from
the government.18 Most people assumed that, when they spoke with
their doctors concerning private medical issues, the views and advice
offered were the doctors’ own and not those of the government or
another third party.19
Justice Souter’s agreement with the Rust majority, rather than
with the dissenters, can serve as an important starting point that
shows just how much his views of government speech changed over
the next eighteen years. An issue raised by the Rust dissenters—that
a reasonable patient in a Title X program would not view the speech
as government speech—subsequently became one of Justice Souter’s
primary concerns with the doctrine. As the doctrine developed, and
as Justice Souter focused more on the political accountability
necessary to control government speech, the reasonable observer test
became increasingly central in his approach to the doctrine.20
For example, in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, Justice
Souter’s focus on how the speech was viewed by a reasonable
observer led him to conclude that the speech at issue there did not
constitute government speech.21 And in Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum,22 Justice Souter concurred in the judgment that the
permanent Ten Commandments statue in the park of Pleasant Grove
City constituted government speech because a reasonable observer

17. Id. at 210–11 (citations omitted).
18. Id. at 217.
19. Id. With regards to unconstitutional conditions, the dissent argued that the Court in
Rust embraced a principle that had been discarded with the rights-privileges distinction,
namely, that “the First Amendment could be read to tolerate any governmental restriction
upon an employee’s speech so long as that restriction is limited to the funded workplace.” Id.
at 213. The dissent applied heightened scrutiny that the Title X regulations did not pass.
20. The reasonable observer test is a variation of Justice O’Connor’s Establishment
Clause endorsement test as set out initially in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688
(O’Connor, J., concurring), which dealt with government display of religious symbols.
21. 544 U.S. 550, 577–78 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting), discussed infra pp. 2108–10.
22. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009), discussed infra pp.
2113–16.
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would know that the monument’s moral and religious message was
the government’s own.23
In 1995, four years after Rust, the Court held in Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia24 that a public
university’s refusal to fund a student magazine with a Christian
theme25 at the same time it was funding other student organizations
was a violation of the First Amendment. The Court found that the
student activity fund from which the Christian magazine was
applying for funds was a “metaphysical” limited public forum that
was intended to enable private speech and, as such, could not
discriminate according to viewpoint.26 Though the university argued
that it was discriminating according to content (permitted in a
limited public forum), the Court rejected this argument and
effectively held that religious belief was a viewpoint.27
Rosenberger is often cited for its broad language describing the
government speech doctrine implicit in Rust,28 even though
Rosenberger was not a government speech case: the university had
expressly stated that it was not its own speech that was at issue.29 In
fact, one of the requirements imposed on student organizations for
receiving funding was signing a disclaimer that distanced the
university from the speech of the recipients.30
Justice Souter’s dissent, therefore, focused primarily on the
Establishment Clause and why a government’s financial
contributions to a Christian magazine violated the central

23. Id. at 1141.
24. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, with Justices O’Connor
and Thomas writing separate concurring opinions. Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 822.
25. The Court described the group at issue as a student news organization with a
Christian editorial viewpoint rather than as a religious organization in response to the
university’s argument that the group was a religious organization, and that funding such
organizations was therefore inconsistent with the guidelines of the school’s funding program.
Id. at 840.
26. Id. at 830–31.
27. Id. at 833.
28. “We recognized [in Rust] that when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes. When the government
disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by
the grantee.” Id. at 833 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 830.
30. Id. at 823–24.
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prohibition of the Establishment Clause.31 However, in an important
footnote, Justice Souter articulated for the first time his concern with
properly identifying government speech.32 While he agreed that
Rosenberger did not involve government speech, he pointed to a
problem that would arise later for the Court: what speech should be
analyzed in assessing whether it is the government speaking.33 Was
the speech at issue the initial funding because funding has a
communicative element analogous to speech? Or was it the ultimate
speech that was being funded?
In other words, Justice Souter questioned how far beyond pure
speech the government speech doctrine extended. If it applied to the
initial funding, then the exception would swallow the rule, making
forum analysis and other First Amendment analysis exceptionally
narrow. As government had funded most of the forums that were at
issue, it could argue that this initial funding immunized the matter
from First Amendment review, with the result that government
could discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in almost any case. On
the other hand, if the doctrine related only to pure speech such that
the government was communicating directly through official
channels—for example, legislation—then the doctrine said nothing
new. The difficulty was in drawing the line between these two
extreme positions, and in this footnote Justice Souter put the Court
on notice. In so doing, he anticipated the possible intrusion of the
government speech doctrine on forum analysis.
At this juncture, it is worth making an analytical observation. In
retrospect, Rust and Rosenberger represent two very different and
important categories in government speech jurisprudence. Rust was a
case in which the Court determined that it was the government that
31. Id. at 863–64 (Souter, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 892–93 n.11 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The Court draws a distinction between
a State’s use of public funds to advance its own speech and the State’s funding of private
speech, suggesting that authority to make content-related choices is at its most powerful when
the State undertakes the former. I would not argue otherwise, but I do suggest that this case
reveals the difficulties that can be encountered in drawing this distinction. There is a
communicative element inherent in the very act of funding itself, and although it is the student
speakers who choose which particular messages to advance in the forum created by the
University, the initial act of defining the boundaries of the forum is a decision attributable to
the University, not the students. In any event, even assuming that private and state speech
always may be separated by clean lines and that this case involves only the former, I believe the
distinction is irrelevant here because, as is discussed infra, this case does not involve viewpoint
discrimination.” (citations omitted)).
33. See id.
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was speaking, with the result that the First Amendment prohibition
on viewpoint discrimination was inapplicable.34 In contrast,
Rosenberger was a case in which the Court determined that the
government itself was not speaking; rather, it was enabling private
speech.35 Here, the result was that conventional First Amendment
forum doctrine was indeed applicable. The decision of which
category the particular challenged governmental act fell into was thus
to become outcome-determinative, as it was, for example, in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez.36
III. ADOLESCENCE: GLICKMAN, FINLEY, SOUTHWORTH, AND
LEGAL SERVICES CORP.
In the 1997 case Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.,37
the Court held that an assessment imposed by the Secretary of
Agriculture on fruit growers for generic advertisements did not
violate the First Amendment.38 The Court explained:
First, the marketing orders impose no restraint on the freedom of
any producer to communicate any message to any audience.
Second, they do not compel any person to engage in any actual or
symbolic speech. Third, they do not compel the producers to
endorse or to finance any political or ideological views.39

Justice Souter dissented,40 arguing that the Central Hudson41 test
applied to such compelled commercial speech and that the
assessment failed the test.42 Again in a footnote, Justice Souter raised
the government speech doctrine only to say that the government had
never argued that it was applicable in Glickman.43 Perhaps indicative
of his growing discomfort with the government speech doctrine,
however, Justice Souter did not describe the doctrine in expansive
34. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1990).
35. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 821.
36. 531 U.S. 533 (2001), discussed infra pp. 2107–08, where Rosenberger controlled,
not Rust.
37. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
38. Id. at 469–70.
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 477 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined by Chief Justice and
Justice Scalia, and joined in part by Justice Thomas. Id.
41. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
42. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 491–92 (Souter, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 482 n.2.
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terms, but rather said that the doctrine meant only that “the
Government may have greater latitude in selecting content than
otherwise permissible under the First Amendment.”44
One year later, in NEA v. Finley,45 the Court, in an opinion by
Justice O’Connor, held that a federal statute requiring that grants
made by the National Endowment for the Arts take into
consideration whether a project was “indecent” or “disrespectful”
did not facially violate the First Amendment.46 One of the issues
taken up by Justice Souter in dissent was his vigorous disagreement
with the broad proposition set out in Justice Scalia’s concurrence
that this case involved government subsidies of speech that were
beyond the scope of the First Amendment because, according to
Justice Scalia, such subsidies could never constitute an abridgement
of anyone’s speech.47
More to the present point, Justice Souter went on to observe in
Finley that the government had disavowed any claim that it was
speaking through its NEA grants.48 In his view, the government was
not a market participant either as speaker or as buyer—both of these
roles receive special treatment under the First Amendment—but
rather was a patron “financially underwriting the production of art
by private artists and impresarios for independent consumption.”49
Accordingly, for Justice Souter, Rosenberger controlled this case and
the government was thus engaged in impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.50
In 2000, two years after Finley, Board of Regents of the University
of Wisconsin System v. Southworth51 presented a fact pattern similar to
44. Id. (citations omitted).
45. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). As noted, Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority. Justice
Ginsburg joined in part, while Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
judgment. Justice Souter alone dissented. Id. at 571.
46. Id. at 572–73.
47. Id. at 598–99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id. For Justice Souter, then, when government acts as patron, it is not engaged in
government speech and is thus not immune from the generally applicable First Amendment
rule prohibiting viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 611–12.
Recall that in Rosenberger, Justice Souter spoke tentatively about the question of
whether or when initial government funding could be characterized as government speech. See
discussion supra pp. 2101–02. For Justice Souter, this issue was unavoidable in Finley because
government, in funding artistic projects, acts as a patron financially underwriting private speech
intended for independent consumption. Finley, 524 U.S. at 611–12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
51. 529 U.S. 217 (2000). Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. Justice Souter, joined
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the one the Court had addressed in Rosenberger. This time, though,
the First Amendment issue was raised by students who were being
“taxed” to fund the speech of student organizations.52 In
Southworth, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that a
mandatory student activity fee assessed on students to support
student organizations did not violate the First Amendment rights of
students who objected to the political and ideological speech of
certain funded organizations.53 Southworth was essentially a
compelled speech/subsidy case, because the university had expressly
declared that its disbursement of funds was not government speech.
The Court therefore did not engage in government speech analysis.54
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy did discuss the government speech
doctrine and its possible justification. He suggested that had
Southworth involved government speech, it would have been outside
the bounds of First Amendment scrutiny because political
accountability, rather than judicial review, served to limit the
government.55 “When the government speaks, for instance to
promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the
end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its
advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could
espouse some different or contrary position.”56
Justice Kennedy’s brief discussion of political accountability in
Southworth represents an early instance—perhaps the first— in which
a member of the Court attempted to ground the government speech
doctrine jurisprudentially.57 In subsequent cases, as will be seen, this
concern with political accountability would become central for
Justice Souter.
Concurring in the judgment in Southworth, Justice Souter agreed
that the case did not implicate government speech.58 But, he was
uncomfortable with the Court’s apparent deference to, and reliance
on, the university for that determination.59 Interestingly, his
by Justices Stevens and Breyer, concurred in the judgment. Id. at 236.
52. Id. at 220.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 234–35.
55. Id. at 235.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 239–43 (Souter, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 241 n.8 (“Unlike the majority, I would not hold that the mere fact that the
University disclaims speech as its own expression takes it out of the scope of our jurisprudence
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reluctance in Southworth to rely exclusively on government assertions
for government speech purposes is reminiscent of that of Justice
Kennedy himself, the author of Southworth, in connection with
designated public forums. Justice Kennedy, concurring in
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,60 maintained
that in deciding whether government property is a designated public
forum, the Court should not merely rely on the government’s
statement of its purpose, but rather on how the government has
actually treated the space.61 “In my view, the inquiry must be an
objective one, based on the actual, physical characteristics and uses of
the property.”62 Justice Kennedy worried that government has
incentives to claim that its property is not a designated public forum
because of the costs of compliance with the First Amendment.63
Here is how Justice Kennedy put it there:
If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at
issue and the actual public access and uses that have been
permitted by the government indicate that expressive activity
would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the
property is a public forum. The most important
considerations in this analysis are whether the property shares
physical similarities with more traditional public forums,
whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in
broad public access to the property, and whether expressive
activity would tend to interfere in a significant way with the
uses to which the government has as a factual matter
dedicated the property.64
In Southworth, Justice Souter applied analogous concerns to
government speech because here, too, there were comparable
incentives for government to avoid First Amendment scrutiny.65 For
him, whether the First Amendment applies should not turn simply
on whether the government has identified the speech as its own or
disclaimed it; that is, what the government says about the speech
on government directed speech.”).
60. 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. Id. Justice Souter joined the first part of this concurrence, the part relevant to the
present discussion.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 695–99.
64. Id. at 698–99.
65. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 241 n.8
(Souter, J., concurring).
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after the fact should not be dispositive.66 However, Justice Souter did
not explain in any detail in Southworth how the Court should
determine whether the government was in fact the speaker.
Subsequently, in making this determination, he would shift the focus
from the government’s assertions to the perspective of the reasonable
observer.67
In the Term following Southworth, the Court held in Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez that a federal statute violated the First
Amendment because it broadly restricted recipients of Legal Services
Corporation funds from providing legal representation that involved
an effort to amend or challenge existing welfare laws, even if that
legal representation was separately funded.68 Writing for the Court
(including Justice Souter), Justice Kennedy explained and then
distinguished Rust:
The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the
rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under
Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting
the holding in later cases, however, we have explained Rust
on this understanding. We have said that viewpoint-based
funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the
government is itself the speaker, or instances, like Rust, in
which the government “used private speakers to transmit
specific information pertaining to its own program.”69
However, according to the Court, not every government subsidy
creates a government speech scenario.70 Where, as in Legal Services
Corp., government subsidizes individuals and groups for the purpose
of facilitating private speech, forum analysis is appropriate just as it
was in Rosenberger.71 In these situations, when there is no
“programmatic message,” the government may not discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint.72 In the course of its opinion, the Court also
emphasized the distorting effects of the funding condition on the
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 577 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
68. 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001). Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, dissented. Id. at 549.
69. Id. at 541 (citations omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
70. Id. at 542.
71. Id. at 542–44.
72. Id. at 548.
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adversary system and the legal process.73 For these reasons, the
statute violated the First Amendment.74
IV. COMING OF AGE: JOHANNS, GARCETTI, AND SUMMUM
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,75 handed down in 2005,
generated important doctrinal developments in government speech
doctrine. Here, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, ruled that
mandatory assessments on beef producers that were used to
disseminate the advertisement, “Beef, it’s what’s for dinner,” did not
violate the First Amendment because the advertisement constituted
government speech.76 Johanns was very similar factually to an earlier
case, United States v. United Foods,77 which had held that a
government assessment on mushroom growers for generic
advertisements was compelled speech forbidden by the First
Amendment.78 But, unlike in United Foods, in Johanns the
government argued that the advertisements were government speech
since the Secretary of Agriculture exercised final control over the
message.79
Johanns presented the Court with its first real opportunity to
consider the free speech implications of the government speech
doctrine when it involved compelled speech.80 The Court held that
the federal statute authorizing the speech, accompanied by
government control of the message, rendered the advertisement
government speech.81 As a result, the compelled nature of the speech
did not make a significant difference in the analysis because
government has the right to tax and spend.82 Furthermore, it did not

73. Id. at 544.
74. Id. at 549.
75. 544 U.S. 550 (2005). Justice Breyer concurred, Justice Ginsburg concurred in the
judgment, Justice Kennedy dissented, and Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and
Kennedy, dissented.
76. Id. at 557–67.
77. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
78. Id. at 415–16.
79. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–62.
80. While the Glickman case, set out supra Part III, similarly involved an assessment and
dealt with compelled speech, government speech was not addressed because the government
did not make a government speech argument.
81. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–62.
82. Id. at 559.
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matter for First Amendment purposes whether the speech was
facilitated through a general tax or through a targeted assessment.83
Justice Souter dissented on the ground that this was not an
instance of government speech at all.84 In his view, “the Court ha[d]
it backwards.”85 The First Amendment focus should be neither on
whether government stated that the speech was government speech,
nor on government control of the speech.86 Rather, it should be on
whether a reasonable observer viewed it as government speech.87 In
Johanns, there was no way for a reasonable observer to know that it
was the government speaking.88
To the contrary, two factors indicated to Justice Souter that it
was not the government speaking when the advertisement was
distributed. First, the advertisements included the tagline, “funded
by America’s Beef Producers.”89 A reasonable observer who read this
tagline would conclude that a group of private parties was behind the
advertisement.90 Second, the government’s Dietary Guidelines for
2005 (which surely constituted government speech) carried the
message that Americans should eat less beef.91 Here the government
would be advancing seemingly contradictory messages if the
advertisement constituted government speech.92
Justice Souter, referring to “the requirement of effective public
accountability,” emphasized the importance of government clearly
holding itself out as the speaker; the primary justification for
exempting government speech from First Amendment scrutiny is
that the political process keeps the speech in check.93 “Democracy, in
other words, ensures that government is not untouchable when its
83. Id. at 562.
84. Id. at 580 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 578.
86. Id. at 578–80.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 577–78.
89. Id. at 577.
90. Id. at 577–78.
91. Id. at 578 n.7.
92. Justice Scalia responded to Justice Souter’s latter argument by maintaining that the
messages were not in fact contradictory: government could promote beef for dinner while at
the same time encouraging Americans to limit their overall beef consumption. “The beef
promotions are perfectly compatible with the guidelines’ message of moderate consumption—
the ads do not insist that beef is also What’s for Breakfast, Lunch, and Midnight Snack.” Id. at
561 n.5 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 577–78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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speech rubs against the First Amendment interests of those who
object to supporting it; if enough voters disagree with what
government says, the next election will cancel the message.”94
Justice Souter went on to offer a philosophical grounding of his
own for the government speech doctrine. Citing the dissenting
opinion of Justices Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis, in Abrams v.
United States,95 he suggested that it was the “marketplace of ideas”
rationale that made the government speech doctrine necessary.96
Under this rationale, government has an important role as a
participant in the marketplace of ideas in which there is a “free trade
in ideas.”97 It would not be able to participate in that marketplace if
citizens could use the First Amendment as a “heckler’s veto.”98 For
these reasons, it was essential, according to Justice Souter, that the
Court ensure that it was in fact the government speaking.99
Here, one might wonder why Justice Souter, so concerned with
government “subterfuge” and misleading of taxpayers “by
concealing its sponsorship of expression,” relied on the marketplace
of ideas rationale for the government speech doctrine.100 This
rationale, at least in its pure form, assumes that every buyer and seller
in the marketplace of ideas has the same opportunity to participate
and that no single participant monopolizes that marketplace or
distorts it by drowning out the ideas of others.101 Under this
rationale, a significant role of government in the marketplace of ideas
is that it be neutral. But government neutrality in the marketplace of
ideas seems inconsistent with the government’s expression of its own
views in that marketplace. Furthermore, government can potentially
monopolize or distort the marketplace more readily than most
private sellers of ideas.102

94. Id. at 575.
95. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
96. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 n.3 (citing Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)). The famous dissent in Abrams also articulated the “clear and present danger test”
for speech that incites. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627–28 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
97. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
98. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 572–80.
100. Id. at 578–79 n.8.
101. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY (1859) (articulating the search for truth rationale).
102. Indeed, the Court found government distortion of the relevant marketplace of ideas
in Legal Services Corp. See supra Part III.
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In contrast, the self-government rationale of the First
Amendment espoused by Alexander Meiklejohn103 perhaps more
persuasively addresses the importance of political accountability,
particularly where government enlists the private sector in
communicating its messages. This rationale, of necessity, confronts
head-on the issue of government monopolization and distortion of
the political process.104 It also strengthens Justice Souter’s argument
about the crucial importance of government’s identifying itself as the
speaker.
In the next term, the Court, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,105 an
exceptionally important public employee free speech case, held that a
deputy district attorney’s First Amendment rights were not violated
when he was allegedly retaliated against by his supervisors for writing
a memo to them alleging problems in the prosecution of a criminal
case.106 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy indicated that there
was a government speech element present whenever public
employees spoke pursuant to their official duties:
The significant point is that the memo was written pursuant to
Ceballos’ official duties. Restricting speech that owes its existence
to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not
infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what
the employer itself has commissioned or created.107

103. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (2000).
104. Note, however, that the Court in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010),
was not seriously concerned with monopolizing and distorting of the electoral marketplace by
unlimited expenditures by corporations and unions for (or against) candidates for federal
office.
105. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, while Justices Stevens
and Breyer dissented separately, and Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
also dissented.
106. Id. at 425–26.
107. Id. at 421–22 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995) (“When the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular
policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.”)). Garcetti modified the balancing test of
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
This test triggered First Amendment scrutiny whenever a public employee’s speech was on a
matter of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140. In contrast, Garcetti imposed the
threshold requirement that the speech must not be part of the employee’s duties. Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 426. If the speech is part of the employee’s duties, the First Amendment is simply
inapplicable, even where the speech is of the greatest public concern. Id. at 418–26. For an
assessment of Garcetti, see Sheldon Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing
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Here, as in Johanns, the Court was again willing to agree that the
government’s message was whatever it said it was. In this case, the
“policy” that the government was promoting determined the official
duties of the employees it hired.
In a vigorous dissent in which he attacked every aspect of the
Court’s decision, Justice Souter criticized the Court’s reliance on the
government speech rationale:
The key to understanding the difference between this case and Rust
lies in the terms of the respective employees’ jobs and, in particular,
the extent to which those terms require espousal of a substantive
position prescribed by the government in advance. Some public
employees are hired to “promote a particular policy” by
broadcasting a particular message set by the government, but not
everyone working for the government, after all, is hired to speak
from a government manifesto.108

In order for the deputy district attorney’s memo to be
government speech, Justice Souter argued that it would have had to
set out a specific and substantive government message.109 Rust “is no
authority for the notion that government may exercise plenary
control over every comment made by a public employee in doing his
job.”110 It was in this context that Justice Souter also expressed
concern about academic freedom and the unintended effect that
Garcetti could have on it.111
In Garcetti, Justice Souter clearly saw the category of
government speech colonizing more and more First Amendment
jurisprudence: “The fallacy of the majority’s reliance on
Rosenberger’s understanding of the Rust doctrine . . . portends a
bloated notion of controllable government speech going well
beyond the circumstances of this case.”112 His fear was that the
Court in Garcetti had allowed the government speech doctrine and
its consequent First Amendment immunity to extend to whatever
the government said was its speech, without any requirement

and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008).
108. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST
AMENDMENT L. REV. 54 (2008).
112. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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imposed on government to announce in advance what that speech
was.113
Finally, in 2009, in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,114 the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, held that government’s
acceptance of a privately donated monument of the Ten
Commandments for permanent display in a public park, while
rejecting a monument offered by the Summum sect years later, did
not violate the First Amendment as impermissible viewpoint
discrimination since the Ten Commandments monument was
government speech.115 In what seemed to parallel conventional
public forum analysis,116 the Court looked to tradition and history to
determine that the Ten Commandments monument was indeed
government speech:
Governments have long used monuments to speak to the public.
Since ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rulers have erected
statues of themselves to remind their subjects of their authority and
power. Triumphal arches, columns, and other monuments have
been built to commemorate military victories and sacrifices and
other events of civic importance. A monument, by definition, is a
structure that is designed as a means of expression. When a
government entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it
does so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some
feeling in those who see the structure.117

Then, in order to find that a reasonable observer would know
that a monument on government land was necessarily representative
of the government’s message, the Court analogized public property
owners to other property owners:
It certainly is not common for property owners to open up their
property for the installation of permanent monuments that convey
a message with which they do not wish to be associated. And
because property owners typically do not permit the construction
of such monuments on their land, persons who observe donated
monuments routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as
conveying some message on the property owner’s behalf. In this
113. See id. at 437–38.
114. 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). Justice Alito wrote for the Court. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, concurred, as did Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas. Justice Breyer also
concurred, while Justice Souter concurred in the judgment.
115. Id. at 1129.
116. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
117. Pleasant Grove City, 129 S. Ct. at 1132–33.
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context, there is little chance that observers will fail to appreciate
the identity of the speaker. This is true whether the monument is
located on private property or on public property, such as national,
state, or city park land.118

Finally, the Court observed that a monument could be
government speech even if it did not communicate a particular
message. It said:
This argument fundamentally misunderstands the way monuments
convey meaning. The meaning conveyed by a monument is
generally not a simple one like “‘Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner.’”
Even when a monument features the written word, the monument
may be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted
by different observers, in a variety of ways. Monuments called to
our attention by the briefing in this case illustrate this
phenomenon.
What, for example, is “the message” of the Greco-Roman mosaic
of the word “Imagine” that was donated to New York City’s
Central Park in memory of John Lennon? Some observers may
“imagine” the musical contributions that John Lennon would have
made if he had not been killed. Others may think of the lyrics of
the Lennon song that obviously inspired the mosaic and may
“imagine” a world without religion, countries, possessions, greed,
or hunger.
Or, to take another example, what is “the message” of the “large
bronze statue displaying the word ‘peace’ in many world
languages” that is displayed in Fayetteville, Arkansas?119

In what would be his last judicial opinion dealing with
government speech, Justice Souter concurred in the judgment in
Summum.120 He agreed with the Court that government need not
formally declare that particular expression was its own.121 But he was
reluctant to maintain, as the Court apparently did, that monuments
were categorically government speech.122 In his view, there were
situations, such as sectarian identifications in Arlington Cemetery,
where government acceptance and maintenance of monuments on

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
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public space would not “look like” government speech.123 In
addition, because the government speech doctrine was “recently
minted” the Court should move slowly in this area.124
Furthermore, the government speech doctrine could interact in
unexpected ways with the Establishment Clause.125 Justice Souter
imagined a situation in which government erected a religiously
themed monument and, to avoid violating the Establishment Clause,
quickly surrounded it with other monuments.126 Though this would
dilute the religious character of the initial monument, it would at the
same time create so many messages that it was less obvious that
government was speaking.127 In this situation, applying the
government speech doctrine could potentially allow a government to
discriminate among religious groups by favoring some over others,
thereby evading the Establishment Clause:
[T]he government could well argue, as a development of
government speech doctrine, that when it expresses its own views,
it is free of the Establishment Clause’s stricture against
discriminating among religious sects or groups. Under this view of
the relationship between the two doctrines, it would be easy for a
government to favor some private religious speakers over others by
the choice of monuments to accept.128

Consequently, rather than adopting a rule that monuments
accepted by government always constitute government speech,
Justice Souter yet again suggested applying the reasonable observer
test on a case-by-case basis when making the determination that it
was the government speaking and communicating a particular
message.129 Under this test, the question was “whether a reasonable
and fully informed observer would understand the expression to be
government speech, as distinct from private speech the government
chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public
land.”130 In Summum, according to Justice Souter, the Ten
Commandments monument passed this test and thereby constituted
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1141.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1141–42.
Id. at 1142.
Id.
Id.
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government speech: it was “an expression of a government’s position
on the moral and religious issues raised by the subject of the
monument.”131 Thus, he concurred in the judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Souter could not have imagined in his first year on the
Court that Rust, which he joined, would be transformed into the
paradigmatic government speech case; nor could he have imagined
where it would lead. As his views on government speech evolved,
they became increasingly thoughtful, even if not daring and pathbreaking like the dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in the
“clear and present danger test” years. Justice Souter was concerned
with the adverse effects of expanding the scope of the government
speech doctrine and consequently immunizing more and more
government-directed speech from First Amendment scrutiny. Of
particular interest here was his attempt, incomplete as it may have
been, to ground the government speech doctrine on the marketplace
of ideas rationale.
More noteworthy doctrinally, though, was Justice Souter’s
emphasis on political accountability and the related need to know
that it is indeed government that is speaking and that there is a
particular message. Finally, he warned of the need to reconcile the
government speech doctrine and the Establishment Clause to ensure
that the former did not swallow up the latter.
For his contributions to, and wise cautionary observations about,
the government speech doctrine, Justice David Souter deserves our
appreciation.

131. Id. at 1141.
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